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IMPOSSIBLE, IMPRACTICABLE, OR JUST
EXPENSIVE?
ALLOCATION OF EXPENSE OF ANCILLARY
RISK IN THE CMBS MARKET
GEORGETTE CHAPMAN POINDEXTER*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that A and B enter into a loan agreement wherein A
promises to repay principal and interest to B at specified intervals
secured by a first lien on A's shopping mall. In making the loan to
A, B assessed several risk factors culminating in calculating the
default risk that A may not repay the entire loan amount.' In
analyzing A's default risk profile, B will not only look to A's
creditworthiness but also to other factors that may impede or
preclude full performance by A. In response B may require
covenants and promises by A to address these factors. For
example, B will require that A purchase property insurance that
will compensate B in the event of casualty. B may require a
covenant that A maintain adequate cash flow to cover the debt
service. However, despite the most thorough due diligence on B's
part, an unexpected event can occur which shakes the underlying
covenants that composed A's risk profile. Suddenly A's loan is
much riskier and, by corollary, under-priced to compensate B for
the new risk.
Should B be entitled to readjust A's risk profile and demand a
higher return thus shifting the cost of readjustment to A? In other
* Professor of Real Estate, Wharton School, Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. This article is an extension of a paper presented
May, 2002 at the Robert Kratovil Memorial Lecture in Real Estate Law at
John Marshall Law School. Thanks to Stuart Ebby, Rick Jones, Donald
Siskind, Todd Sinai, Peter Linneman, Chris Mayer and Michael Knoll for
comments and insights on a previous draft. Of course, remaining errors
belong to me.
1. Other risks include interest rate risk (which affected whether A might
prepay the loan if market interest rates dropped), and informational risk
(where there is asymmetry of information between the parties that may lead
to an uneven bargaining situation). Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated
Rolling Equity: Analyzing Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY
L. J. 519, 543 (2001).
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words, who assumes the risk and bears the burden of changed
circumstances of A's default profile? To take the analysis one step
further, if A refuses to perform the covenants and will not take on
the cost of the additional risk, should B be permitted to declare a
default or is A excused from the risk without threat of default?
From a contract theory perspective the answer will turn on an
analysis of the unexpected event and how/if A and B implicitly or
explicitly calculated the probability of the unexpected event. To
restore A's pre-event risk profile will it be impossible,
impracticable or just expensive?
This commentary will address the implications of event risk.
No one can accurately predict all future risks, particularly those
outside, or ancillary, to the real estate market. The purpose of this
discussion is to begin to formulate a legal structure that will allow
parties to address unforeseen ancillary risk and reflect legal
treatment of such risk in their pricing.
I. BACKGROUND.
In the single lender/borrower scenario (referred to as a whole
loan), the risk profile of the borrower is private and
individualistic.2 However, when we move into the open market of
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) the risk profile is
not only public, but also standardized. The hallmark of the CMBS
market is its ability to match risk with return in pricing mortgage
debt. In contrast with the whole loan market, CMBS offers
investors the insight (and protection) of default risk assessment
that is correlated to both the strength of the underlying mortgage
pool and the subordination level of a particular class of securities.
The higher the rating on a class, the less likely it will suffer a
default but the lower the yield. The lower the rating the more
likely the reverse is true. Rating agencies such as Moody's,
Standard and Poor's, and Fitch assess the likelihood of ultimate
receipt of principal and the timely receipt of interest: i.e., it is an
assessment default risk.' Their ratings do not reflect other risks
such as interest rate risk, event risks, or informational risks.'
Since September 11, 2001 the impact of event risk has had a
new effect on default likelihood considerations. These events are
not real estate-related risks (economic downturns, over-leveraged
borrowers, etc.). In fact, they occur outside the sphere of
traditional real estate-related risks. The term ancillary risk or
default, as used in this commentary, does not refer to defaults
caused by the under performing loan collateral: the real estate
2. Id. at 541-42.
3. Id. at 543.
4. Id.
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asset. Rather it refers to defaults caused by non-real estate
related events. The U.S. District Court's5 decision that World
Trade Center leaseholder Larry Silverstein could only collect from
some carriers for one insured occurrence,6 brings into sharp focus
the possibility of ancillary default and the power of ancillary
events to bring about delinquency and default in commercial real
estate mortgages. Instead of collecting for two insured events, Mr.
Silverstein stands to collect only for one event even though both
towers were destroyed.7 This fifty percent reduction in available
insurance proceeds was most certainly not anticipated in assessing
the likelihood of default because Mr. Silverstein cannot
reconstruct the Towers.
Ancillary default risk, as used herein, is more than event risk,
though. It is a risk that has industry wide, as opposed to property
specific, implications and whose existence was wholly
unanticipated in scope and magnitude.
This article uses the aftermath of 9/11 as an example. It
focuses on two consequences: (1) the unforeseen plunge in business
travel after September 11, 2001 which threatens the net operating
income (and hence debt service coverage ratio covenants) in hotel
loans; and (2) the new terrorism insurance requirements
(including forced placement) imposed on borrowers at the renewal
of their property and casualty insurance. This commentary
proposes contract interpretation that will promote transparency of
the possibility of event risk and recognition of ancillary default
risk to effectuate a more robust rating/pricing scheme.
Furthermore, this article will focus exclusively on so-called
"non-monetary default," i.e. defaults other than nonpayment of
monthly debt service.8 This is not to imply that ancillary default
risks such as natural disasters and war cannot result in the non-
payment of debt service. Obviously they can. Rather, this focus on
non-monetary default allows exploration of the concept of changed
circumstances such that, if revealed ex ante (instead of ex post),
would have resulted in a different risk profile of the transaction.
As stated in the author's previous work, the CMBS market
could not efficiently function without the participation of the
rating agencies Rating agencies model default risk and inform
5. SR. Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., 222 F. Supp. 2d
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
6. Id. at 399.
7. Id. The loan documents in this transaction contained a covenant to
rebuild. Id.
8. See Glossary, available at http://rdinit.usda.gov/regs/handbook-
w6gloss.pdf (defining non monetary default as a default that does not involve
the payment of money).
9. See Poindexter, supra note 1, at 543 (describing how the CMBS market
reflects risk).
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prospective investors of the relative risk of non-payment. ° This
article strives to take this attempt at risk transparency one step
further to sharpen the analysis of default risk of the underlying
loans that translate into the default profile of the CMBS pool.
Instead of reacting after the fact to an ancillary risk, we can
interpret the underlying legal documents in a constructive manner
for reflecting non-asset based default risk. Rating, and hence
pricing, relies on full information on the part of the rating agency.
The obvious difficulty with anticipating ancillary events is that by
definition they are unexpected and unanticipated. Further
complicating this analysis is the tendency of hindsight bias to
overestimate the likelihood and the foreseeability of events such as
the 9/11 tragedy. However, more legal structure as part of the
default risk analysis may be highly beneficial. Such structure
sharpens the rating agencies' gaze and provides more complete
information to the investors and other CMBS market participants.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CMBS MARKET
The CMBS market is a secondary market in which
commercial mortgages are pooled." Investors buy certificates
collateralized by the income stream from the pool of mortgages.
12
The pools are rated by rating agencies that assess the likelihood of
default based on subordination levels. 3 The higher the rating, the
more underlying subordination and the less likely the investor will
suffer a loss through default. 4 As of the first quarter of 2002,
private label issuances of securitized debt (i.e. not GSE or federal
related agencies) came close to $300 billion. 5
Defaults and delinquencies have begun to up-tick in the
securitized pools. 6 One rating agency reports that there were
more than one hundred and thirty-one defaults in 2000-more than
10. In fact several rating agencies have begun to integrate terrorism risk
into their rating model. See generally Moody's Investors Service, CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Terrorism Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, in
STRUCTURED FINANCE: SPECIAL REPORT 1 (Mar. 1, 2002).
11. See Poindexter,. supra note 1, at 520 (stating that the pooling of
commercial mortgage loans generates tradable debt securities backed by the
pool of loans).
12. Id.
13. See id. at 521 (explaining the concept of subordinated rolling equity).
14. See id. at 532 (discussing the structure of the CMBS market).
15. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Flow of Funds Accounts, Mortgage
Banker's Ass'n of America, at http://www.mbaa.org/cref/data/02/
cmdo_q102.html (last visited May 4, 2003).
16. However, defaults and delinquencies in the CMBS market still pale in
comparison to massive default/delinquency scenario of the real estate
depression of the early 1990s.
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double the 1999 defaults. 7 In 2001, fifty-six percent of the deal
population had at least one loan default since issuance, as
compared to thirty-six percent in 1999.18 Analysts attribute this
increase to seasoning of conduit loans, expansion of the loan
population and weakening economics in certain property sectors.' 9
Whereas worsening economic conditions drove defaults prior to
September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks ratcheted up the specter
of default to a new level."° For example, before 9/11 the hotel
sector had a default rate of 2.61 percent.21 The abrupt slow-down
in business travel exacerbated an already bleak situation. After
September 11, analysts peg the default rate in the hotel sector at
226.30 percent.
Terrorism insurance is another new wrinkle in the CMBS
market. In response to 9/11, CMBS servicers have begun to
require purchase of this insurance product, which historically had
been bundled with property insurance. This mandate produced
several consequences. First, a lack of insurance product
threatened to put loans into technical default. Second, even if the
product was available, its cost was prohibitive. Third, if borrowers
refuse to purchase the policy it can be force-placed by the
servicers. This dries up the cash flow from the pool, threatens the
ratings, and applies upward pressure on the yields of the
securities of the transaction. The spread between the yield on
CMBS and comparable treasuries widened as much as
approximately thirty basis points since 9/11.2
3
17. Fitch Ratings, Perfect to a Default: 2001 CMBS Conduit Loan Default
Study, STRUCTURED FINANCE: COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT, May
7, 2001 at 1, available at http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/
report.cfm?rptid=126128 (last visited May 4, 2003).
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. To put this in context, however, in 1992 the delinquency rate in the
lodging sector was 15.05 percent. Id. This high delinquency rate was
primarily due to profligate financing rather than collapse in property
operating performance. Id. See also CMBS Quarterly Insights: The Shape of
CMBS Since Sept. 11, STRUCTURED FINANCE, Oct. 23, 2001 (noting that
despite the enormous tragedy on September 11, no defaults were expected
which would be due to the events at the World Trade Center).
22. Fitch Ratings, 2002 CMBS Conduit Loan Default Study, STRUCTURED
FINANCE: COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT, Aug. 14, 2002, at 5,
available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report.cfm?rpt-id=152030 (last
visited May 4, 2003).
23. Robert Burgess, Terror Coverage Cost Holds Up Deals, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2002, at 29.
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III. ANCILLARY DEFAULT RISK
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent economic and political
changes were not anticipated in assessing the risk in the CMBS
market. However, these events threatened loan solvency in a
similar manner as the overbuilding and high vacancy rates of the
last recession. In fact, today's CMBS market has moved from a
favorable B stress environment to a more stressful BB
environment.24 The difference between the two stress producing
environments is that overbuilding (real estate/economic related
risk) could have (should have) been modeled into the lender's
underwriting and default risk analysis. The events of 9/11 provide
an excellent example of risk that could not have been anticipated.
During the contract negotiations between lender and borrower,
neither party contracted to undertake the risk so the question
posed is who should bear the risk now?
To analyze this issue we can look to contract theory-
specifically the theory of impracticability. Unlike a traditional
analysis, however, this article is not so interested in contract
damages in light of one party's non-performance. Rather, this
commentary focuses on how and if unexpected non-real estate
related risk can be addressed contractually. Ancillary default risk
from non-real estate related events impacts a borrower's default
profile and thus, for purposes of transparency, should be modeled
in the same fashion as real estate risk.
Before discussing how to incorporate the threat of ancillary
default in the legal documentation underlying a CMBS
transaction, it would be useful to expand on how the events of 9/11
impacted the CMBS market. Illustrative of this impact are the
deepening crisis in the hotel sector and the requirement to
purchase terrorism insurance.
A. Hotel Sector
Even before 9/11, the hotel sector showed signs of struggle
due to a softening economy. "5 After 9/11, occupancy levels
plummeted.26 For instance, Moody's cut MGM Mirage and Park
24. Fitch Ratings, Perfect to a Default, supra note 17, at 1.
25. Cracks in the sector were evident in 1999 when both Duff & Phelps and
S&P downgraded Asset Securitization Corp.'s 1997-MD VII transaction based
on a continuing decline in the performance of Fairfield Inn loans. See DCR
Places Asset Securitization Corporation, Series 1997-MD VII on Rating Watch-
Down, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9, 1999; Adam Tempkin, Is the Hotel Sector
Finally Stabilizing?, Mortgage Backed Securities Letter, July 31, 2000, at 1. S
& P issued a further downgrade in 2001. CMBS Quarterly Insights: The
Shape of CMBS Since Sept. 11, supra note 21.
26. See Christina Binkley, Empty Rooms: U.S. Hotels Struggle to Cope with
Drop in Guests Since Attack, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2001, at Al (describing
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Place Entertainment Corp. to below investment grade.27 Fitch cut
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide and Hilton Hotel Corp to
junk status citing the tough economic outlook in the hotel
industry. 28 As of September 2002, hotel sector loans that were
securitized in the CMBS market had a delinquency rate of 4.61
percent-far in excess of retail (2.07 percent), multifamily (1.12
percent), and office (0.69 percent) rates.29 In light of the impact of
9/11 on their industry, some hotel executives even went to
Washington in search of tax breaks and other relief," though no
such relief was forthcoming.
The events in the lodging sector provide one bookend to our
discussion of whether ancillary risk can be addressed in drafting
loan documents. While 9/11 certainly had a negative impact on
the default profile of the pools in the lodging sector, the change
was of degree, not of kind. The risk of low occupancy and hence
low revenue is a constituent part of the default risk profile. What
was unanticipated was not that there might be a chance of
decreased occupancy. Rather, the unanticipated factor was that
occupancy would plummet so far, so quickly. The first boundary
parameter to the analysis, therefore, is that an unexpected event
that exacerbates existing default risk is not an ancillary risk.
B. Terrorism Insurance
Most standard mortgage documentation obligates the
borrower to purchase insurance "as the lender may reasonably
require." Prior to 9/11, insurance against terrorism was wrapped
into a borrower's all risk insurance policy.3 However, for example,
when the insurance policy for Mall of America in Minnesota came
up for renewal in January 2002 the owner, Simon Property Trust,
provided a new insurance policy that explicitly excluded coverage
for loss or damage due to terrorism. 2 The loan servicer, GMAC,
how two weeks after Sept. 11, occupancy down 38.4 percent).
27. Christina Binkley, Moody's Cuts Back Ratings on MGM and Park Place,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2001, at A2.
28. Id.
29. Loan Performance by Property Type Sept., 2002, available at
http://www.trepp.com (last visited May 4, 2003). It should be noted that in a
historical context these "high" lodging sector delinquencies are low. Id. In
1992 the delinquency rate in this sector averaged 15.05 percent. Id. CMBS
Quarterly Insights: The Shape of CMBS Since Sept. 11, supra note 21.
30. See Binkley, supra note 26, at Al (discussing the hotel industry's
attempt to get governmental support).
31. See John B. Levy, Policy Dispute: GMAC, Mall Owner Battle Over
Terror Coverage, BARRONS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 33 (discussing increased
commercial mortgage delinquencies and the conflict between one Simon
property group and GMAC commercial mortgage).
32. Id.
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insisted that the property be insured for losses due to terrorism.3
GMAC threatened to force place" an insurance policy covering
terrorism at a cost of 750,000 dollars for 100 Million dollars in
coverage.35 Simon obtained a temporary restraining order on the
purchase.36
Similar noteworthy battles were played out between lenders
and borrowers across the country. 7 The cost and availability of
separate terrorism insurance was affecting the financiability of
urban skyscrapers and large malls considered to be at risk of
attack as well as midrise office buildings far from the any likely
terrorist activity. 8  Some commentators blamed the sluggish
beginning39 and widening spreads ° over treasuries of the CMBS
market of 2002 on the uncertainty over terrorism insurance.
Lack of terrorism insurance dulled the real estate loan
market.4 As a result of a scramble to obtain an insurance product
that was never previously required, lenders postponed or canceled
billions in pending new commercial mortgage loans.42 From the
insurance companies' perspective, the economic difficulty in
pricing and providing terrorism insurance is easily understood.43
Abrupt changes in expectations forced risk managers to exclude
and limit coverage until they could reassess the degree of risk
involved and obtain reinsurance." In the interim, however,
33. Id.
34. The servicer purchases the policy and then bills the borrower for the
premium.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Gregg Loubier and Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risks of Terror, LOS
ANGELES LAWYER, Sept. 2002, at 19 available at http://www.allen
matkins.com/events/ publications/los-ange.pdf (last visited May 12, 2003)
(noting as an example, the Conde Nast Building in New York and Opryland
Resort and Convention Center in Tennessee).
38. Id. at 20.
39. See John B. Levy, Terror's Modest Price: Loan Market takes insurance
lack in stride, BARRON'S, Feb. 4, 2002, at 33 (describing market uncertainty as
a factor in limiting market activity).
40. Burgess, supra note 23, at 29.
41. See Xenia Jowyk, Terror Insurance Drag on Real Estate Still Climbing:
Over $15.5 Billion of Projects in 17 States Now Affected, THE REAL ESTATE
ROUNDTABLE: NEWS RELEASES, Sept. 19, 2002, (indicating an increase in
cancellation of projects), available at http://www.rer.org/media
newsreleases/pr_091902.cfm (last visited May 12, 2003).
42. See Dawn Kopecki, US CMBS Market Hit by Terrorism Insurance
Costs, Canceled Loans, DOW JONES INT'L NEWS, Apr. 18, 2002 (citing
cancellation of more than seven billion dollars in commercial mortgages due to
terrorism insurance costs). See also Jowyk, supra note 41 (citing over 15.5
billion dollars worth of real estate projects in seventeen states stalled or
cancelled due to scarcity of terrorism insurance).
43. Jowyk, supra note 41.
44. Jo Ann Marzullo, Dealing with Insurance Exclusions in Response to
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existing borrowers were left uninsured and in technical default or
faced huge premiums. Furthermore, rating agencies began to
warn of possible downgrades signaling a change in default risk for
lack of terrorism insurance.45  In fact, Moody's and Fitch
downgraded billion of dollars in single asset CMBS due to
terrorism insurance concerns.46
Just as in the hotel sector, some industry players called for
intervention by the federal government to reinsure terrorism
policies.47 In contrast to the hotel pleas, bills were introduced in
Terrorism, 16 PROB. & PROP. 37, 38 (Sept./Oct. 2002). Large losses, such as
terrorist attacks, create problems in the insurance market because of lack of
independence. Id. Decomposing the risk (i.e. separating terrorism from the all
risk policy) leaves the undiversifiable risk with the policy holders. Id. For an
explanation of this risk partitioning see generally Karl Borch, Equilibrium in
a Reinsurance Market, 30 ECONOMETRICA 424, (1962) (describing that the
presence of uncertainty will result in less than efficient reinsurance markets);
Georges Dionne & Neil Doherty, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk:
Contract Structure and Organizational Form of Insurance Firms, 6 J. OF RISK
AND UNCERTAINTY 187, 199 (1993) (describing that insurance contracts will be
separated into contracts where risk can be pooled and contracts where risk
cannot be pooled).
45. See Julie Haviv, Moody's Warns Commercial Mortgages without Terror
Insurance, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, May 3, 2002 (noting that without
Congressional action, the CMBS would face downgrades); Dawn Kopecki, US
CMBS Market Hit by Terrorism Insurance Costs, Canceled Loans, DOW JONES
INT'L, Apr. 18, 2002 (describing the weakness of CMBS market); Policy
Dispute: GMAC, Mall Owner Battle Over Terror Coverage, BARRON'S, Mar. 4,
2002, at 33 (describing that the largest issue facing the mortgage industry is
the lack of terrorism insurance). In light of the uncertainty surrounding who
would be required to purchase terrorism insurance, Moody's created a matrix
assessing the likelihood of requiring terrorism insurance from a ratings
perspective. Id. See Daniel B. Rubock & Tad Phillips, CMBS: Moody's
Approach to Terrorism Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, Structured
Finance: Special Report, Mar. 1, 2002, at 3 (indicating that insurances had
difficulties with putting premiums on terrorism risks).
46. Janet Morrissey, REITs Hail Passage of Terrorism Insurance
Legislation, Dow JONES Bus. NEWS, Nov. 20, 2002.
47. The most notable players were the Mortgage Bankers Association and
the American Bar Association. See More than $8 Billion in Commercial
Property Deals Killed, Delayed or Changed Due to Terrorism Insurance Issues,
NEWS RELEASE (Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of America) July 15, 2002, at 5,
available at http://www.mbaa.org/news/2002/pr0715a.html (last visited May
12, 2003) (indicating that the Mortgage Bankers Association believes that the
federal government should pay for the initial losses for reinsurance); Martha
Neil, Terrorism Insurance Bailout Stalls in Congress, 17 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3
(May 3, 2002). Such public reinsurance is not a novel concept. Id. In the
United Kingdom the Pool Reinsurance ("Pool Re") was established in 1993. Id.
See James G. Rizzo, Tragedy's Aftermath: The Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance
Industry, 46 BOSTON B. J. 10, 13 (Jan./Feb. 2002). In Israel, there are two
government backed insurance programs for terrorism risk. Id. However,
there has been opposition to such governmental intervention. See Dawn
Kopecki and Julie Haviv, Consumer Group Says Broad Terror Insurance Bill
20031
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both houses that in differing parameters, provided a governmental
backstop to loss due to terrorism.4 8 The Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 was signed by President George W. Bush in November
2002.4" This program institutes temporary government/private
sector risk sharing of catastrophic loss due to international
terrorism and provides mandatory availability of insurance
product."
Even though terrorism existed in the United States prior to
9/11 (e.g. the bombing of the Federal office building in Oklahoma
City in 1995, or even the first bombing of the World Trade Center
in 1993), the purchase of terrorism insurance was certainly not
even discussed in loan negotiations before 9/11. However after
9/11, loans without such insurance faced either downgrades by
rating agencies or exponential leaps in insurance premium costs
that threatened cash flow and even solvency.5 Our other bookend
boundary, then, is that an ancillary risk must be one that
introduces an entirely new risk to the default profile that did not
exist at the time the loan contract was drafted.
IV. IMPOSSIBLE OR EXPENSIVE?
Simply denominating the ancillary risk as "new," however,
only begins the analysis. The ancillary risk that threatens a
borrowers' default profile cannot have been within contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting. Otherwise, it would have
been modeled by the rating agencies. The trick is to cut a dividing
line between performance that an ancillary event made more
Unnecessary, DOW JONES INT'L NEWS, Aug. 22, 2002 (arguing that the federal
government does not need to support a backup of terrorism insurance claims).
48. Id.
49. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-297, § 101, 116
STAT. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002). Under the new law, insurance companies would
be responsible for paying a deductible increasing from seven percent of
premiums in 2003 to fifteen percent of premiums in 2005. Id. § 102. The
federal government will pay for ninety percent of claims above the deductible.
Id. § 103. Losses paid by the federal government are capped at 100 billion
dollars per year. Id. The real estate industry applauded this measure. Id.
See also Standard & Poor's, REITs likely to Benefit from Passage of Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act, Nov. 20, 2002, available at
http://news.cnet.com/investor/newsitem/0-9900-1028-20688004-0.html (last
visited May 12, 2003) (indicating that REITs will benefit from the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act); Joseph B. Treaster, Industries Welcome US Aid on Terror
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at C5. However, rating agencies were
less enthusiastic. See Standard & Poor's, Little Ratings Cheer for Insurers,
Nov. 26, 2002, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/newswire/nationa2002/111/26/ 24625.htm (last visited May 12, 2003)
(stating that "[firom a rating perspective the positive effects are few").
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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expensive than originally envisioned and performance made
impossible or commercially impracticable by an ancillary event.
By analogy, the legal theory undergirding ancillary risk is akin to
theories of contractual impossibility/impracticability. 2 By mining
the rich and developed law of contract impossibility and
impracticability, we can refine the boundaries of what should and
should not be defined as ancillary risk.53 Furthermore, this body of
law gives guidance as to possible remedies for who should bear the
expense of ancillary risk should one occur."
A. What is Impossibility/Impracticability?
A contracting party is not relieved from his/her obligations
under the contract simply because performance becomes more
burdensome or less desirable." In fact, contract performance is
tantamount to strict liability under the theory of pacta sunt
servanda.56 There are times, though, where the court will excuse
non-performance if such performance is impossible.57 Moreover,
the notion of impossible has been widened to encompass
"commercially impracticable" when performance can only be done
at excessive and unreasonable cost.58  The defense of
impracticability shields a contracting party if events after contract
52. See generally John D. Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation: The
Effect of Changed Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of
Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503 (1988) (describing the relation of risk to the
commercial impracticability defense).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (stating
that the difficulty or improbability of accomplishing a task would not excuse a
party from performing under the contract). See also Ellis Gray Mill Co. v.
Sheppard, 222 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Mo. 1949) (stating that unforeseen difficulties
will not excuse a party from performing under the contract).
56. Latin for "agreements must be kept." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133
(7th ed. 1999).
57. See, e.g., Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 40 (N.Y. 1877) (excusing
performance for an ill opera star); Chicago, M. & St. P. RY. Co v. Hoyt, 149
U.S. 1 (1893) (excusing performance in a situation that involved leases of
grain elevators).
58. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). See also
Sheldon Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1133 (1987) (stating that "[wlith these few simple
words, physical impossibility had become commercial impracticability"). For a
complete review of the history of the evolution of the doctrine of
impracticability see Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and
Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985). Care should be
taken here though. Id. Simply because the cost of performance increases does
not satisfy the requirement of commercial impracticability. Id.; Am. Trading
& Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd. 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972).
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formation dramatically increase the cost of performance.59 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides relief for
impracticability in section 261:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.6°
Therefore, if a contract term is deemed commercially
impracticable, the party is excused from performance of that
obligation without threat of default.6 1
There is an underlying supposition here that must be
highlighted. The non-occurrence of the event must have been a
basic assumption at the time of contracting. 2 In other words, the
occurrence of the event that caused the dramatic increase in cost
of performance must not have been contemplated at the time of
contracting.63 Otherwise, the obligor implicitly takes the risk of
increased cost of performance.64  This stream of theoretical
analysis dovetails well with the foundation laid above for defining
ancillary risk and default. As previously stated, an ancillary risk
is unanticipated and constitutes an entirely new dimension to the
default profile. 5
Unforeseeability of ancillary risk thu becomes crucial. It
stands to reason that if an event is foreseeable, performance after
the event cannot be deemed impracticable. Events that are
foreseeable can and should be insured against by the contracting
66party whose performance would be rendered more expensive.For example, take a contract where A contracts to supply B
59. Susan Wuorinen, Northern Indian Public Service Company v. Carbon
County Coal Company: Risk Assumption in Claims of Impossibility,
Impracticability and Frustration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 163 (1989).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
61. Id.
62. See id. § 261 cmt. b (describing the assumption made in order for the
defense to be used).
63. Id.
64. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
United States v. Winstar 518 U.S. 839, 906 (1996). See also John Elofson, The
Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Analysis of the
Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
1, 4 (1996) (noting that "contracts implicitly allocate most risks of performance
to the promisor").
65. See supra notes 55 and 58 and accompanying text.
66. See Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 655, 659
(Minn. 1978) (asking "whether the risk.., was so unusual or unforeseen and
would have such severe consequences that to require performance" would
produce an unbargained for advantage).
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next year with 100 widgets for 100 dollars. In this scenario, A
bears the risk of an increase in price of widgets. If A is concerned
about the fluctuating widget prices, she can hedge or otherwise
buy price insurance. However, a rise in widget prices will not
relieve A from delivering at the agreed upon 100 dollars because a
rise in widget prices is foreseeable at the time of contracting.67
The issue becomes clearer if we situate foreseeability in the
context of ancillary risk of the events of 9/11. In the hotel
industry, the aftermath of 9/11 produced a sharp drop-off in
occupancy.8  Therefore, the relevant question is whether
occupancy fluctuations were in contemplation of the parties when
they entered into the mortgage contract? Certainly. Just as in the
widget example, the answer to this question forces the conclusion
that non-performance cannot be excused on the basis of
impracticability.6 9
On the other hand, after 9/11 lenders began to require
borrowers to incur insurance premiums exponentially higher
because of terrorism coverage."0  Was such an increase in
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting? Probably
not. This is especially true in light of the fact that terrorism
insurance did not exist as a U.S. insurance product prior to 9/11,
despite previous acts of terrorism on U.S. soil.7 Therefore, the
definition of ancillary risk must be refined to provide that the
mere event, in this case the terrorism, is not the causative root of
impracticability. Rather, it is the aftermath of the event that must
be unforeseen and not in contemplation of the parties to the
contract.
V. Ex POST RULES GUIDING EX ANTE NEGOTIATION
The maddening difficulty in this exercise is applying
boundaries defined post contract formation to negotiations that, by
definition, are before formation of the contract.72 A default rule of
67. See Elofson, supra, note 64 at 1.
68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 44 and 55 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 10, 39, and 42 and accompanying text.
71. See William C: Thompson, Jr., One Year Later: The Effects of 9/11 on
Commercial Insurance Rates and Availability in New York City, N.Y. City
Comptroller's Office, Nov. 13, 2002, available at
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/opm/reports/11-13-02-insurance-report.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2003) (releasing the results of a survey demonstrating a
dramatic increase in commercial insurance premiums and a significant decline
in the availability of insurance since 9/11). Unlike war, terrorism was not
excluded from the all risk coverage. Id. It was included in property and
business interruption policies and not a separately rated exposure. Id.
72. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The doctrine of commercial
impracticability in a second-best world, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1990)
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contract interpretation will guide the modeling of risk.73 The
struggle in promoting a default rule for contract interpretation
that resolves the ambiguity of ancillary risk lies in determining
who bears the burden of the ramifications of a new event,
unforeseen and, hence, uncontemplated by the parties at the time
of contracting. To begin to unravel this piece of the puzzle, the
preliminary inquiry should focus on what is the goal of the default
rule: ex ante certainty or ex post efficiency.
Ex ante certainty relies on the premise that contracting
parties only undertake risk contemplated by the contract. In the
case of an unforeseen event that gives rise to commercial
impracticability, the non-breaching party would not be entitled to
expectation damages based on breach of contract but rather only
to restitution or reliance damages. This approach does not
examine which of the parties would be better situated to absorb a
loss from an unforeseen event; it simply excuses performance, thus
promoting a certainty of result.
On the other hand, there is the notion that loss caused by
unforeseeable events should be shared by the parties.75 Some
scholars advocate sacrificing certainty in favor of market efficiency
and fairness." Efficiency of result replaces efficiency of
prediction.77 This approach forces a two-step process. First, the
scenario must fit into the framework of commercial
impracticability." The next task is to determine the better risk-
bearer.9 Which party is better able to absorb the loss? This is
such a mind-boggling task, however, that according to one scholar,
(discussing the difficulty courts have in creating rules that evaluate ex-ante
decisions).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Trakman, supra note 35, at 485 (noting that shared responsibility
requires both parties to bear part of the loss).
76. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case For Formalism In Relational
Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 858 (2000) (noting that "[ilf there are to be
tradeoffs, why not trade off the chimera of ex ante certainty in favor of ex post
efficiency (or fairness")); K.M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" To "Fairness": An
Uneasy Transaction In The Law Of Contracts? 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 95, 177 n. 318 (noting that "[i]t is considered preferable to sacrifice
some of the values of the twin pillars of classical contract doctrine, certainty
and predictability, in exchange for what are more relevant rationales and just
results").
77. Scott, supra note 76, at 858.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
79. This brings to bear the test posited by Posner and Rosenfeld: the better
bearer of a risk is the party that would have incurred lower risk appraisal and
lower transaction costs in insuring against that risk. Richard A. Posner and
Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1977).
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courts are more likely just to opt for full contract performance. °
This analysis is not only difficult, but it also becomes circular.
That is, if an event must be unforeseeable to support commercial
impracticability then determining that one party is in a better
position to have insured against the risk begs the question of
unforeseeability. Going back to the issue of terrorism insurance, if
the demand for this expensive/unobtainable product was not
foreseeable at the time the mortgage was negotiated, how could
one party or the other have hedged the risk?
Thus, the goal of the default rule must be redefined. Rather
than certainty or efficiency, we can insert market transparency.
The default risk (from known and unknown sources) should be
reflected in the pricing and rating of the securities. This goal
differentiates the ancillary risk discussion from the more
traditional impracticability analysis. While the standard
impracticability scrutiny centers on who bears the economic
consequences of breach and moves on to compare expectation
damages versus other types of damages, our examination veers off.
In the CMBS arena, we are more concerned with presenting a true
default profile to investors so as to allow intelligent and informed
investment decisions. We then return to the question posed at the
beginning of this discussion: Who bears the economic burden of
changed circumstances that alter the default profile of a
securitized loan-the property owner or the investor?
Based on the theory of commercial impracticability, it should
be the investor that bears the risk for several reasons. First, a
finding of commercial impracticability excuses the borrower from
performance. Hence, if an unforeseen circumstance excuses
performance, it would be illogical to then foist the burden of the
changed circumstance onto the borrowers shoulders by forcing her
to incur the cost of the change. Second, investors in the CMBS
market are in a better position to bear the risk because they are
better equipped to diversify." CMBS securities holders are largely
institutional investors with vastly diversified portfolios. By
comparison, most owners of the underlying real estate range from
small developers with two or three properties to large developers
who, while owning a large real estate portfolio, are still far less
80. Scott, supra note 43, at 859. See, e.g., Freidco of Wilmington, Del., Ltd.
v. Farmers Bank of the State of Del., 529 F. Supp. 822, 830 (D. Del. 1981)
(noting that the court refused the landlord's claim of impracticability of a cap
on utility reimbursement). "Discharge or alteration of contractual obligations
is an extraordinary remedy, however, and is not justified absent a showing of
the occurrence of an event which has in fact rendered performance
commercially impracticable." Id.
81. See Poindexter, supra note 1, at 532.
82. Id.
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diversified than the pension fund that buys CMBS securities.
This leads to the default rile of contract interpretation in the
event of ancillary risk: If the ancillary risk results in commercial
impracticability that would excuse the borrower from performing,
the investor bears the risk of the cost of changed circumstances.
Putting this in the context of terrorism insurance, the loan
servicer could not demand and could not force place the insurance.
A logical extension of the application of this ex post rule would
result in an ex ante inclusion of unforeseen risk in the initial
pricing of the security. Investors, knowing they would bear the
risk of unforeseen circumstances would possibly demand a higher
yield from the inception of the transaction to compensate them for
undertaking the unknown risk.
This would, in essence, shift some of the burden back onto the
shoulders on the property owners as their cost of financing would
increase. This is not necessarily a bad outcome. It complements
the argument of prevailing legal theory that burden of non-
performance should be shared and allocated on and economically
efficient basis. Furthermore, it preserves the goal of certainty in
contract interpretation-the property owner knows exactly the
cost of the contract at the outset of the transaction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above-articulated default rule would assign a value to a
previously unquantified risk. Waiting for the unforeseen event to
occur and then reacting often results in a panic that overstates
and magnifies the risk. By transforming ancillary risk into a
pricing element, investors get a clearer picture of the risk
presented by the CMBS pool. Owners would therefore gain the
benefit of the certainty of contract as a property right that is
reflected in their financing costs. Last but not least, a higher level
of transparency and recognition of ancillary default risk will
promote a more efficient and robust rating/pricing scheme.
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